The concepts of symmetry, symmetry breaking and gauge symmetries are discussed, their operational meaning being displayed by the observables and the (physical) states. For infinitely extended systems the states fall into physically disjoint phases characterized by their behavior at infinity or boundary conditions, encoded in the ground state, which provide the cause of symmetry breaking without contradicting Curie Principle. Global gauge symmetries, not seen by the observables, are nevertheless displayed by detectable properties of the states (superselected quantum numbers and parastatistics). Local gauge symmetries are not seen also by the physical states; they appear only in non-positive representations of field algebras. Their role at the Lagrangian level is merely to ensure the validity on the physical states of local Gauss laws, obeyed by the currents which generate the corresponding global gauge symmetries; they are responsible for most distinctive physical properties of gauge quantum field theories. The topological invariants of a local gauge group define superselected quantum numbers, which account for the θ vacua.
Introduction
The concepts of symmetries, symmetry breaking and gauge symmetries, at the basis of recent developments in theoretical physics, have given rise to discussions from a philosophical point of view.
1 Critical issues are the meaning of spontaneous symmetry breaking (appearing in conflict with the Principle of Sufficient Reason) and the physical or operational meaning of gauge symmetries.
The aim of this talk is to offer a revisitation of the problems strictly in terms of operational considerations. The starting point (not always emphasized in the literature) is the realization that the description of a physical system involves both the observables, identified by the experimental apparatuses used for their measurements, and the states, which define the experimental expectations. Since the protocols of preparations of the states may not always be compatible, i.e. obtainable one from the other by physically realizable operations, the states fall into disjoint families, called phases, corresponding to incompatible realizations of the system. This is typically the case for infinitely extended systems, where different behaviors or boundary conditions of the states at space infinity identify disjoint phases due to the inevitable localization of any realizable operation.
This feature, which generically is not shared by finite dimensional systems, provides the explanation of the phenomenon of spontaneous symmetry breaking, since the boundary conditions at infinity encoded in the ground state represent the cause of the phenomenon in agreement with Curie principle.
The role of the states is also crucial for the physical meaning of gauge symmetries, which have been argued to be non-empirical because they are not seen by the observables. The fact that non-empirical constituents may characterize the theoretical description of subnuclear systems, as displayed by the extraordinary success of the standard model of elementary particle physics, has provoked philosophical discussion on their relevance (see [1] ). For the discussion of this issue it is important to distinguish global (GGS) and local gauge symmetries (LGS).
The empirical consequences of the first is displayed by the properties of the states, since invariant polynomials of the gauge generators define elements of the center of the algebra of observables A, whose joint spectrum labels the representations of A defining superselected quantum numbers; another empirical consequence of a global gauge group is the parastatistics obeyed by the states. Actually the existence of a gauge group can be inferred from such properties of the states.
At the quantum level, the group of local gauge transformations connected to the identity may be represented non-trivially only in unphysical non-positive representations of the field algebra and therefore they reduce to the identity not only on the observables, but also on the physical states.
From a technical point of view, a role of LGS is to identify (through the pointwise invariance under them) the local observable subalgebras of auxiliary field algebras (represented in non-positive representations).
LGS also provide a useful recipe for writing down Lagrangians which automatically lead to the validity on the physical states of local Gauss laws (LGL), satisfied by the currents which generate the corresponding GGS. Actually, LGL appear as the important physical counterpart of LGS representing the crucial distinctive features of Gauge QFT with respect to ordinary QFT.
A physical residue of LGS is also provided by their local topological invariants, which define elements of the center of the local algebras of observables, the spectrum of which label the inequivalent representations corresponding to the so-called θ vacua. The occurrence of such local topological invariants explains in particular the breaking of chiral symmetry in Quantum Chromodynamics (QCD), with no corresponding Goldstone bosons.
Finally, since only observables and states (identified by their expectations of the observables [2] [3]) are needed for a complete description of a physical system, and both have a deterministic evolution, the problem of violation of determinism in gauge theories looks rather an artificial issue from a physical and philosophical point of view.
Symmetries and symmetry breaking
For the clarification of the meaning and consequences of symmetries in physics, from the point of view of general philosophy, a few basic concepts are helpful.
Quite generally, the description of a physical system (not necessarily quantum!) is (operationally) given [2] [3] in terms of 1) the observables, i.e. the set of measurable quantities of the system, which characterize the system (and generate the so-called algebra A of observables) 2) their time evolution 3) the set Σ of physical states ω of the system, operationally defined by protocols of preparations and characterized by their expectations of the observables {ω(A), A ∈ A} Operationally, an observable A is identified by the actual experimental apparatus which is used for its measurement, (two apparatuses being identified if they yield the same expectations on all the states of the system)
The first relevant point is the compatible realization of two different states, meaning that they are obtainable one from the other by physically realizable operations. This defines a partition of the states into physically disjoint sets, briefly called phases, with the physical meaning of describing disjoint realizations of the system, like disjoint thermodynamical phases, disjoint worlds or universes.
For infinitely extended systems, in addition to the condition of finite energy, a very strong physical constraint is that the physically realizable operations have inevitably some kind of localization, no action at space infinity being physically possible. Thus, for the characterization of the states of a phase Γ, a crucial role is played by their large distance behavior or by the boundary conditions at space infinity, since they cannot be changed by physically realizable operations. Typically, such a behavior at infinity of the states of a given phase Γ is codified by the lowest energy state or ground state ω 0 ∈ Γ, all other states of Γ being describable as "localized" modifications of it. Thus, ω 0 identifies Γ and defines a corresponding (GNS) representation π Γ (A) of the observables in a Hilbert space H Γ , with the cyclic ground state vector Ψ 0 .
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The simplest realization of symmetries is as transformations of the observables commuting with time evolution, operationally corresponding to the transformations of the experimental apparatuses which identify the observables (e.g. translations, rotations). This is more general than Wigner definition of symmetries as transformations of the states which leave the transition probabilities invariant (adapted to the case of the unique Schroedinger phase of atomic systems).
Actually, the disentanglement of symmetry transformations of the observables (briefly algebraic symmetries) from those of the states (Wigner symmetries), is the crucial revolutionary step at the basis of the concept of spontaneous symmetry breaking, which comes into play when there is more than one phase.
An algebraic symmetry β defines also a symmetry of the states of a phase Γ (i.e. a Wigner or unbroken symmetry) iff it may be represented by unitary operators U β in H Γ .
An algebraic symmetry β always defines a symmetry of the whole set of states Σ:
but in general ω and ω β need not belong to the same phase Γ, i.e. their preparation may not be compatible, so that the symmetry β cannot be experimentally displayed in Γ as invariance of transition probabilities, by means of physically compatible operations (spontaneously broken symmetry). Thus, the breaking of β in Γ is characterized by the existence of states ω ∈ Γ (typically the ground or vacuum state ω 0 ) such that ω β / ∈ Γ. The philosophical issue of symmetry breaking, also in connection with Curie principle, has been extensively debated often with misleading or wrong conclusions.
A widespread opinion is that symmetry breaking occurs whenever the ground state is not symmetric, but this is not correct for finite systems, for which (under general conditions) there is only one (pure) phase Γ, so that both ω 0 and ω 0 β belong to Γ and β is described by a unitary operator.
Thus, the finite dimensional (mechanical) models, widely used in the literature to illustrate spontaneous symmetry breaking, on the basis of the existence of non-symmetric ground states, are conceptually misleading.
3
On the other hand, for a pure phase of an infinitely extended system, thanks to the uniqueness of the translationally invariant state (implied by the cluster property which characterizes pure phases), the non-invariance of the ground state ω 0 ∈ Γ under an internal symmetry β (i.e. commuting with space-time translations) implies that ω 0 β cannot belong to Γ and β is broken in Γ. Under these conditions, the noninvariance of the ground state provides an explanation in agreement with Curie principle, identifying the cause in non-symmetric boundary conditions at infinity encoded in the ground state (see [4] pp.23, 102). The philosophically deep loss of symmetry requires the existence of disjoint realizations of the system, which is related to its infinite extension.
The existence of an algebraic symmetry reflects on empirical properties of the states and may be inferred from them. In fact, an unbroken symmetry implies the validity of Ward identities, which codify the existence of conserved quantities and of selection rules satisfied by the states; for continuous symmetries the conservation laws hold even locally by the existence of current continuity equations implied by the first Noether theorem ( [5] , p.146-7). For a continuous symmetry group G broken in Γ, even if the generators do not exist as operators in H Γ , the existence of a representation of G at the algebraic level, ( [4] , Chapter 15), implies symmetry breaking Ward identities which display corrections given by non-symmetric ground state expectations, called non-symmetric order parameters; an important empirical consequence is the existence of Goldstone bosons, for sufficiently "local" dynamics ( [4] , Chapters 15-17).
Global gauge symmetries
For the debated issue of the empirical meaning of global gauge symmetries (GGS) (which by definition act trivially on the observables), a crucial (apparently overlooked) point is that a complete complete description of a physical system involves both its algebra of observables and the states or representations which describe its possible phases. In fact, even if there is no (non-trivial) transformation of the observables corresponding to GGS, GGS are strictly related to the existence of disjoint representations of the observable algebra and their empirical meaning is to provide a classification of them in terms of superselected quantum numbers [8] . This is clearly illustrated by the following examples. Example 1. Consider a free massive fermion field ψ transforming as the fundamental representation of an internal U(2) = U(1) ⊗ SU(2) symmetry with the algebra of observables defined by its pointwise invariance under U(2). The existence of the (free) Hamiltonian selects the Fock representation in H F for the field algebra F generated by ψ and this implies the existence of the generator N of U(1) and of the Casimir invariant
with T α , α = 1, ...3, the representatives of the generators of SU (2) . N and T 2 are invariant under the gauge group U(2) and as such they (or better their exponentials U N (α) = exp iαN , U T (β) = exp iβT 2 , α, β ∈ R) may be taken as elements of the center Z of the observable algebra A. The eigenvalues n ∈ N of N and j(j + 1) (j ∈ 1 2 N) of T 2 label the representations of A in H F and the fermion fields ψ * , ψ act as intertwiners between the inequivalent representations of A, by increasing/decreasing the numbers n and j.
Had we started by considering only the observable algebra A, we would have found that its representations are labeled by the (superselected) quantum numbers n and j(j + 1), corresponding to the spectrum of the central elements U N (α), U T (β) and that the state vectors of the representations of A are obtained by applying intertwiners to the n = 0, j = 0 representation, consisting of the Fock vacuum.
We would then be led to consider a larger (gauge dependent) algebra F generated by the intertwiners, to interpret n as the spectrum of the generator N of a U(1) group and to infer the existence of an SU(2) group with j(j + 1) the eigenvalues of the associated T 2 . Such a reconstructed U(2) group acts non-trivially on the intertwiners, but trivially on the observables, namely is a global gauge group. Example 2. A familiar physical system displaying the above structure is the quantum system of N identical particles, even if in textbook presentations the relation between the gauge structure and the center of the observables is not emphasized.
The standard treatment introduces the (Weyl algebra A W generated by the) canonical variables of N particles and, by the very definition of indistinguishability, the observable algebra A is characterized by its pointwise invariance under the non-abelian group P of permutations, which is therefore a global gauge group.
As before, its role is that of providing a classification of the inequivalent representations of the observable algebra contained in the unique regular irreducible representation of A W , (equivalent to standard Schroedinger representation) in the Hilbert space H = L 2 (d 3N q), where P is unbroken. H decomposes into irreducible representation of the observable algebra, each being characterized by a Young tableaux, equivalently by the eigenvalues of the characters χ i , i = 1, ...m. [9] For our purposes, the relevant point is that the characters are invariant functions of the permutations and, as such, may be considered as elements of the observable algebra, actually elements of its center Z.
Thus, as before, the gauge group P provides elements of the center of the observables whose joint spectra label the representations of A defining superselected quantum numbers. Beyond the familiar onedimensional representations (corresponding to bosons and fermions) there are higher dimensional representations, describing parastatistics (i.e. parabosons and parafermions).
Another empirical consequence of a global gauge group is the (observable) statistics obeyed by the states, a parastatistics of order d arising as the result of an unbroken (compact) global gauge group acting on ordinary (auxiliary) bosons/fermions fields [10] , [11] . In the model of Example 1, an observable consequence of the global gauge group U(2) is that the corresponding particle states are parafermions of order two (meaning that not more than two particles may be in a state). The quarks have the properties of parafermions of order three as a consequence of the color group SU(3) (historically this was one of its motivations).
In conclusion, contrary to the widespread opinion that the gauge symmetries are not empirical, the global gauge symmetries are displayed by the properties of the states (superselected quantum numbers and parastatistics) and actually can be inferred from them. 4 It must be stressed that a global gauge symmetry emerges as an empirical property of a system by looking at the whole set of its different realizations; in a single factorial representation, the center of the observables is represented by a multiple of the identity and its physical meaning in terms of superselected quantum numbers is somewhat frozen. To reconstruct an operator of the center of A one must look to its complete spectrum, i.e. to all factorial representations of A.
A continuous global gauge group becomes particularly hidden in those representations in which the exponentials of localized invariant polynomials of the generators converge to zero when the radius of the localization region goes to infinity. This corresponds to the case in which, in the conventional jargon, the global gauge group is broken.
In a representation H Γ of the field algebra in which the (continuous) gauge group G is broken, briefly called a G-broken representation, in contrast with the above examples, the charged fields do no longer intertwine between different representations of the observable algebra; in fact, they are obtainable as weak limits of gauge invariant fields in the Hilbert space H Γ (charge bleaching) [12] . Example 4. The Bose-Einstein condensation is characterized by the breaking of a global U(1) gauge group (acting on the Bose particle field as the U(1) group of Example 1), as very clearly displayed by the free Bose gas. 5 The U(1) breaking leads to the existence of Goldstone modes, the so-called Landau phonons, and the existence of such excitations may in turn indicate the presence of a broken U(1) symmetry.
Finally, the gauge group is also reflected in the counting of the states. 4 The empirical meaning of the invariant functions of the generators of a global gauge group has been pointed out in [5] , pp.153-8 and later resumed by Kosso and others; (see also [13] , Chapter 7).
5 For a simple account see [4] , p. 106.
In G-unbroken representations of A, to each irreducible representation of G contained in the field algebra F , there corresponds a single physical state, whereas in the fully broken case to each d-dimensional irreducible representation in F , there correspond d different physical states [14] (for a handy account see [5] , Part B, Section 2.6).
Local gauge symmetries
Traditionally, a local gauge symmetry group is introduced as an extension of the corresponding global group G by allowing the group parameters to become C ∞ functions of spacetime. It is however better to keep distinct the local gauge group G parametrized by strictly localized functions (technically of compact support) from the corresponding global one G, since the topology of the corresponding Lie algebras is very different and invariance under G does not imply invariance under G (as displayed by the Dirac-Symanzik electron field, [13] , p.159).
Also from a physical point of view, the two groups are very different, since in any (positive) realization (of the system) the group of local gauge transformations connected with the identity is represented trivially, whereas the global gauge group displays its physical meaning through the properties of the states (see the above examples). For example, the U(1) global gauge group is non-trivially represented in Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) by the existence of the charged states, whereas the local U(1) group reduces to the identity on the physical states ( [13] , Section 3.2).
Therefore, the natural question is which is the empirical meaning, if any, of a local gauge symmetry (LGS) G in QFT. From a technical point of view, pointwise invariance under G may be used for selecting the local subalgebra of observables, from an auxiliary field algebra F , locality (strictly related to causality [11] ) not being implied by G invariance (e.g. in QEDψ(x) ψ(y) is invariant under G = U(1), but not under G and is not a local observable field).
A deeper insight on the physical counterpart of a LGS is provided by the second Noether theorem, according to which the invariance of the Lagrangian under a group of local gauge transformations G implies that the currents which generate the corresponding global group G are the divergences of antisymmetric tensors
(local Gauss law ). This is a very strong constraint on the physical consequences of G (corresponding to the Maxwell equations in the abelian case). Actually, such a property seems to catch the essential consequence of local gauge symmetry, since G invariance of the Lagrangian is destroyed by the gauge fixing, whereas the corresponding local Gauss laws (LGL) keep holding on the physical states, independently of the gauge fixing. Moreover, a LGL implies that G invariant local operators are also G invariant. In the abelian case this implies the superselection of the electric charge ( [13] , Sect.5.3)
Thus, it is tempting to downgrade local gauge symmetry to a merely technical recipe for writing down Lagrangian functions, which automatically lead to LGL for the currents which generate the corresponding global gauge transformations.
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The physical relevance of a LGL is that it encodes a general property largely independent of the specific Lagrangian model and in fact, most of the peculiar (welcome) features of Gauge QFT, with respect to standard QFT, may be shown to be direct consequences of the validity of LGL (see [13] , Chapter 7): a) a LGL law implies that states carrying a (corresponding) global gauge charge cannot be localized; this means that the presence of a charge in the space time region O can be detected by measuring observables localized in the (spacelike) causal complement O ′ ; this represents a very strong departure from standard QFT, where "charges" in O are not seen by the observables localized in O ′ ; b) LGL provide direct explanations of the evasion of the Goldstone theorem by global gauge symmetry breaking (Higgs mechanism); c) particles carrying a gauge charge (like the electron) cannot have a sharp mass (infraparticle phenomenon), so that they are not Wigner particles; 6 A gauge fixing which breaks the global group G involves a symmetry breaking order parameter and it is consistent only if G is broken (see [13] , p. 178 and [15] ). 7 The fact that LGL represent the distinctive physical property of "local gauge theories" has been discussed and emphasized in [16] , [5] , p. 146-149, and later rediscovered, without quoting the above references.
d) the non-locality of the "charged" fields, required by the Gauss law, opens the possibility of their failure of satisfying the cluster property with the possibility of a linearly raising potential, as displayed by the quark-antiquark interaction, otherwise precluded in standard QFT (where the cluster property follows from locality); e) a local gauge group may have a non-trivial topology, displayed by components disconnected from the identity, and the corresponding topological invariants defines elements of the center Z of the local algebra of observables A; for Yang-Mills theories such elements T n (O), localized in O, are labeled by the winding number n and define an abelian group (T n (O)T m (O) = T n+m (O)); their spectrum {e i2πnθ , θ ∈ [0, π) ]} labels the factorial representations of the local algebra of observables, the corresponding ground states being the θ-vacua. They are unstable under the chiral transformations of the axial U(1) A and therefore chiral transformations are inevitably broken in any factorial representation of A without Goldstone bosons. Thus, the topology of G provides an explanation of chiral symmetry breaking in QCD, without recourse to the instanton semiclassical approximation ( [13] , Chap. 8).
In conclusion, LGS are not symmetries of nature in the sense that they reduce to the identity not only on the observables, but also on the states, possibly except for their local topological invariants. From the point of view of general philosophy, they appear in Gauge QFT as merely technical devices to ensure the validity of local Gauss laws (through a mathematical path which uses an invariant Lagrangian plus a non-invariant gauge fixing).
By the same reasons, i.e. the realization that the observables and the physical states are the only quantities needed for the complete description of a physical system, the issue of violation of determinism in gauge theories does not deserve physical and philosophical attention, since the observables and the physical states have a deterministic time evolution.
Additional discussion required by the referee
The aim of the paper is to present logical (mathematically sound) arguments and critical discussion of ideas and proposals which were previously not sufficiently elaborated from a philosophical point of view; in particular the paper aim is to criticize misleading or wrong conclusions drawn from eminent philosophers of physics.
Empirical meaning of symmetries
For the discussion of the empirical meaning of symmetries it is important to take into account the basic result of (the first) Noether theorem, by which invariance (of the dynamics) under a continuous one-parameter group of transformations is equivalent to the existence of a conserved quantity; hence, the empirical meaning of a symmetry may be provided by the empirical realizations of the symmetry transformations (e.g. space translations, rotations etc.) as well as by the empirical meaning of the associated conserved quantity, which represents the generator of the symmetry. Thus, e.g. the empirical meaning of space translations may be argued by the actual operational realizability of such transformations (in terms of translating observable quantities), as well as by the empirical meaning of the (observable) conserved space momentum. Therefore, it is not appropriate to regard the second manifestation as of indirect empirical significance (as stated in [17] ), since from an experimental point of view this is by far the more easy way for detecting the existence of a symmetry, as also argued by Morrison [18] : "Conservation laws provide the empirical component or manifestation of symmetries".
The peculiarity of a global gauge symmetry is that it cannot be realized as a group of transformations of the observables (being the identity on them), but nevertheless the associated conserved quantity may have an empirical significance in terms of empirical properties of the states, as it is clearly displayed in Quantum Electrodynamics (QED), where the generator of global gauge transformations describes the electric charge of the states, a very relevant conserved physical property. We therefore essentially adopt the following criterium for empirical significance, stated by Earman [19] : "What is objective or real in the world is described by the behavior of the values of genuine physical magnitudes of the theory", however with the crucial gloss that genuine physical quantities include both the observables and the states of the given physical systems.
In conclusion, a symmetry has an empirical significance if it is displayed by properties of the observables (e.g. by defining automorphisms of the algebra of observables) or of the physical states (e.g. by providing conserved quantum numbers which classify the states). It follows that global gauge symmetries are empirical, since their generators provide the conserved superselected quantum numbers which label the physical states, but generally local gauge symmetries are not. To my knowledge, the above relevant gloss has been missed in the discussions on the empirical significance of gauge symmetries, even in papers aiming to clarify the philosophical aspects of gauge symmetries [24] .
Empirical meaning of local gauge symmetries
Practically the whole morning section of the meeting (during which the present paper was presented) was occupied by talks centered on the possible philosophical meaning of local gauge symmetries, dwelling on the philosophical meaning of invariance under local transformations which reduce to the identity on the observables. As argued in Section 4, this looks like a metaphysical issue and, as such, does not deserve scientific attention. The distinction between global and local gauge symmetries is crucial for the discussion of the empirical meaning of gauge symmetries since only the first have a physical meaning whereas local gauge transformations do not.
To this purpose, I quote the final conclusion by Elena Castellani in her contribution "Symmetry and equivalence" in "Symmetries in Physics" (Ref.1): "Today we believe that global gauge symmetries are unnatural...We now suspect that all fundamental symmetries are local gauge symmetries". In the same book, in the conclusion of his contribution "The interpretation of gauge symmetry" M. Redhead writes "The gauge principle is generally regarded as the most fundamental cornerstone of modern theoretical physics. In my view its elucidation is the most pressing problem in current philosophy of physics".
For the discussion of this problem it is crucial to keep distinct the group of gauge transformations which differ from the identity only on compact bounded regions, henceforth called local, and the gauge group of global (i.e. independent from the point in space time) transformations; englobing both under the name of a local gauge group is, in my opinion, not convenient and likely misleading, because it hides the fact that they have a different status about empirical significance and, moreover, invariance under localized gauge transformations does not imply invariance under the corresponding global ones. Hence, as argued in my paper, the two groups should be taken neatly in separate boxes.
Then, the interesting question is what is the role of local gauge symmetries (equivalently of the gauge principle) in the constructions of models of elementary particles and the answer discussed in Section 4 is that they enter only as intermediate steps, doomed to lose any operational and philosophical meaning at the end (except for the related topological invariants, see below). Their merely intermediate role is to lead to the formulation of a dynamics characterized by the validity (on the physical states) of local Gauss laws obeyed by the currents which generate the corresponding global gauge symmetries. Such Gauss laws are not spoiled by the inevitable gauge fixing, needed for quantization (the proof of their validity on the physical states is not trivial in general [15] , even if it is out of discussion in QED): they are detectable properties of the physical states and, as discussed in Section 4, they provide the physical and philosophical distinctive characterization of gauge quantum field theories.
This pattern is clearly displayed by Quantum Electrodynamics where (one may prove that): 1) the local gauge group reduces to the identity both on the observables as well on the physical states, i.e. does not have any empirical meaning, 2) on the other hand, the local Gauss law (somewhat related to the intermediate use of the non-empirical local gauge invariance) has an empirical significance, being one of the Maxwell equations, 3) the global gauge group has an empirical meaning, since its generator is the electric charge, whose corresponding quantum number is superselected.
The recognition that local Gauss laws are the characteristic features of gauge quantum field theories has been argued and stressed in view of quantum theories in [20] [16] [5] and later reproposed, without quoting the above references, by Karatas and Kowalski (1990) [21] , Al-Kuwari and Taha (1990) [22] , Brading and Brown (2000) [23] . Actually, such papers confine the discussion to the derivation of local Gauss laws from local gauge invariance (second Noether theorem at the classical level, with no gauge fixing), missing the crucial fact that at the quantum level local gauge invariance of the Lagrangian has to be broken by the gauge fixing and it is devoid of any empirical (and philosophical) significance, whereas the validity of local Gauss laws keeps being satisfied by the physical states, and it explains the interesting (revolutionary) properties of gauge theories (as explained in Section 4).
In contrast with global gauge symmetries, local gauge symmetries are only useful tricks used in intermediate steps (which use an auxiliary unphysical field algebra, initially a Lagrangian which has local gauge invariance, to be next broken by the gauge fixing, a redundant space of vector "states", only a subspace of which describes physical states, on which local gauge symmetries reduce to the identity). The final emerging picture is a description of the physical system characterized by conserved (actually superselected) quantum numbers, provided by the generators of the global gauge symmetry, and by the validity of local Gauss laws (no trace remaining of local gauge invariance).
In my opinion, from a philosophical point of view, one should invest in the meaning of local Gauss laws rather than on local gauge invariance (or on the so-called Gauge Principle).
Determinism
The issue of violation of determinism should not even be raised, being discussed with reference to equation of motions for gauge dependent variables which are deprived of objectivity and of reality, the objective description of a physical system involving only (the properties of) observables and physical states, whose time evolution is deterministic.
Quite generally, all what is needed for the complete description of a physical system is the determination of the time evolution of its observables and states, but for the solution of the related mathematical problem one may use tricks and auxiliary variables in intermediate steps for which there is no need of a physical (and philosophical) interpretation. Only the final goal and result is relevant and there is a plenty of examples of such a technical strategy in theoretical physics. Thus, in gauge theories it is technically convenient to introduce an auxiliary (gauge dependent) field algebra with well defined dynamics, i.e. such that the (mathematical) Cauchy problem for its time evolution is well posed (existence and uniqueness of solutions). To this purpose one has to introduce a gauge fixing in the Lagrangian, even if it is not necessary to completely fix the gauge; e.g. the Cauchy problem has been proved to be well posed in the Feynman-Gupta-Bleuler gauge, in the temporal gauge, in the Lorentz gauge (all allowing a residual symmetry group of non-constant gauge transformations). The observables are characterized as the functions of such auxiliary fields which are invariant under local gauge symmetry and satisfy locality; this is the (merely) technical role of local gauge symmetry.
In quantum mechanics, once the Hamiltonian H has been defined (as a self-adjoint operator) the time evolution is described by the unitary one-parameter group generated by H and therefore the time evolution is automatically deterministic; thus, for field quantization only those field operator may be introduced which have a deterministic evolution. This is why the quantization of gauge theories requires the introduction of a gauge fixing such that the initial value problem of the (auxiliary) field algebra has a unique solution.
Infinitely extended systems and SSB
In order to be (spontaneously) broken, a symmetry, defined as an automorphism/transformation of the observables, must fail to be implementable by unitary operators acting on the states of a physical realization of the system (otherwise one has an unbroken, i.e. Wigner symmetry). This is possible only if there exist disjoint realizations of the system (with the meaning of disjoint phases or worlds) all described by the same algebra of observables with the same time evolution. The physical/empirical meaning of disjointness is that configurations or states of the system belonging to different phases cannot be prepared in the same laboratory, more generally their protocols of preparation are not compatible. In mathematical language this amounts to the impossibility of describing states of different phases by vectors of the same Hilbert space carrying an irreducible or factorial representation of the algebra of observables. SSB in one realization or phase is explained by, and actually equivalent to, the instability of the phase under the symmetry, by the reason that in order to empirically detect the existence of a symmetry one must be able to operationally compare the behavior of each given configuration with that of its transformed one.
For quantum systems described by a finite number of canonical variables (under general regularity conditions, by Stone-von Neumann the-orem) there is one phase and therefore no SSB, even if there are nonsymmetric ground states, in contrast with the wrong conclusion drawn from classical finite dimensional models with non-symmetric ground states. This leaves open a possibility for systems described by an infinite number of canonical variables, in particular for infinitely extended systems (which require an infinite number of canonical variables).
Then, the next issue is the existence of disjoint phases for infinitely extended systems; in this case different behaviors or different boundary conditions at space infinity of configurations (or states) of the system imply that their preparations are not compatible, since the inevitable localization of any physically realizable operation (involved in passing from one preparation to another) precludes to change the behavior at infinity. Hence, generically infinitely extended systems exhibit more than one phase, characterized by the boundary conditions at infinity, which are generally encoded in the ground state of the given phase, see Proposition 6.3 of Ref. 4) and SSB may occur.
In conclusion, the crucial ingredient for symmetry breaking is the existence of disjoint phases and this occurs for infinitely extended systems (though not exclusively).
References
One of the referee request was to comment on a list of papers dealing with overlapping subjects, qualifying the novelties (if any) with respect to them, (a task, which I will reluctantly try). 1) Brading and Brown [17] . As in all papers by philosophers of physics, which I know of, the discussion overlooks the important fact that an objective description of a physical system should exclusively be based on (the properties of the) observables and states and that the empirical significance of symmetries should be argued in such terms (e.g. automorphisms of the observables and/or conservation laws obeyed by the states, as explained above). The missing clear distinction of global versus local gauge symmetries precludes to immediately reach the conclusion about the empirical significance of the former and the impossible empirical significance of the latter. In fact, in that paper local symmetries are identified as those which depend on "arbitrary smooth functions of space and time"; the lack of any localization restriction implies that the so defined group of local symmetries contains the group of global symmetries as a subgroup, since, as every first year student in mathematics knows, the constant functions satisfy the smoothness condition (the excuse that localizability was tacitly assumed would mean a lack of precision without which mathematics as well as logic do no longer exist).
Had Brading and Brown clearly understood the different status of the two groups and the general argument that local gauge symmetries reduce to the identity both on the observables as well as on the states, they might have reduced their paper to a few lines.
2) Healy 2010 [25] . The paper looks as a rather sketchy account of the common (heuristic) wisdom about θ vacua, completely ignoring the critical revisitation of such a subject, presented in [26] and later further discussed in Ref. [13] . In my opinion, this is not merely a question of mathematical physics precision, since it is very dangerous and certainly not satisfactory to ground a philosophical discussion on ideas, which may have a useful heuristic value, but have serious problems of mathematical and logical consistency. This applies to Healy paper, as I shall try to explain.
The winding number n defined in eq. (10), a crucial ingredient of the discussion, requires that A i (x) are continuous functions and therefore it looses any meaning for relativistic quantum fields, which have been proved to be singular "functions" of space points (technically operator valued tempered distributions). In fact, in order to give a possible meaning to such an equation the standard theoretical physics wisdom is to apply it to regular (euclidean) field configurations in the functional integral formulation (of quantum field theory), the so-called instantons. However, continuity is required and continuous euclidean configurations have zero functional measure (this problem is well known to the eminent theoretical physicists who contributed to this subject, like Coleman, Weinberg etc.). This consistency problem was solved in [26] in a way that has strong philosophical consequences; in fact, no reference is made to the topological structure of the (questionable) semiclassical instanton approximation (of the functional integral) and the proposed solution exclusively exploits the topological invariants of the (non-abelian) local gauge group. It is shown that such topological invariants define elements of the center of the local observable algebra and their spectrum (i.e. the θ angle) characterize the θ vacua. From a general philosophical point of view, the conclusion is that even if the (group of) local gauge transformations connected with the identity reduce to the identity both on the observables as well as on the physical states, the topological invariants which classify the other components disconnected from the identity provide detectable superselected quantum numbers (the θ angles), which classify the physical states, just as the generators of global gauge group do. In conclusion, local gauge symmetries are not empirical except for their topology.
The first sentence of the paper, with the abstract definition of a symmetry as "an automorphism-transformation that maps the elements of an object onto themselves so as to preserve the structure of that object" is too loose and imprecise. Which elements (observables? states?)? For the states a symmetry may possibly preserve the relations between them (preserving transition probabilities); "to preserve the structure" does not have a sharp clear meaning. This applies also to the subsequent attempt of formalization (A 1-1 mapping φ : S → S of a set of situations...) which uses an undefined (vague) concept ("situations").
The merely intermediate role of local gauge symmetries for the validity of local Gauss laws has been missed.
At the end of Section 3. The last two statements are rather misleading. First, local gauge transformations, as well as the topological invariants provided by them, do not relate configurations associated to different vacua; rather the topological invariants define elements of the center of the observables which label (not relate!) the vacua. The author seems to overlook the crucial difference between the empirical significance of a symmetry displayed by transformations or relations (between observables or states) and the empirical significance displayed by the existence of conservation laws (as argued by Morrison). Similarly, the statement at the end of Section 4, that "a large gauge transformation represents a change from one physical situation to another" is conceptually wrong.
Towards the end of Section 5. The "generator"Û of a large gauge transformation cannot be defined because the group of large gauge transformation is not continuously connected with the identity; it is a mathematical non-sense. What may be defined, as done in [26] , are the elements T n of the quotient G/G 0 of the local gauge group G with the local group G 0 of transformations connected with the identity (having zero winding number). Such a quotient is an abelian group, whose elements belong to the center of the local observable algebra and their spectrum (or eigenvalues) are the θ angles.
The paradox raised at the beginning of Section 6: "a global gauge transformation appears as a special case of a large gauge transformation" is a consequence of the improper choice of not distinguishing global and local gauge transformations (see above discussion).
3) Struyve 2011 [27] . The paper is confined to discussing classical field theories, which are known to have serious problems about their physical interpretation, in particular for elementary particles interactions; they may provide some heuristic mathematical information, but they do not describe nature, (with the possible exception of classical gravity, which however requires quantum effect for the description of black holes). The most objectionable point is the discussion of SSB in terms of small perturbations around a non-symmetric ground state. As discussed in Ref. 4 , in classical field theory, the set of small perturbations around the ground state solution is not stable under time evolution and therefore it looses meaning with the passing of time. The set of "perturbations" of a ground state solution φ 0 , which are stable under time evolution are those which define a Hilbert sector or a phase, and are of the form φ 0 +χ, with χ ∈ H 1 , ∂ t χ ∈ L 2 (the corresponding theorems are discussed in [4] ; neither χ norχ remain small! SSB cannot be identified with the instability under the symmetry of the set of small perturbations ("When considering small perturbations around a particular ground state, the equations of motions will not posses the symmetry of the fundamental equations of motion and one speaks of SSB.", at the beginning of Section 2.2.). The widespread cheap heuristic account/explanation of SSB in terms of small perturbations around a non-symmetric ground state is not (mathematically) correct (as discussed in [4] ).
Last but not least, I do not see what the paper significantly add to the gauge invariant account for the Higgs mechanism, in the full quantum case, given by Frohlich-Morchio-Strocchi [14] , which does not even appears in the references of Struyve paper. 4) Smeenk 2006, [28] . The paper is well written, but most of the general discussion of conceptual problems is not novel and largely taken from [4] [5] .
The aim of the paper, stated in the Abstract and in the Introduction ("This article focuses on two problems related to the Higgs mechanism... what is the gauge invariant content of the Higgs phenomenon? and what does it means to break a local gauge symmetry?") is superseded by [14] , quoted only at the very end, probably to comply a referee request. The logical and conceptual discussion of the problems of the Higgs mechanism, together with their solutions, already appeared in [5] and in the 2005 edition of [4] , which are not even mentioned in the references. E.g. the discussion of SSB in Section 2 heavily relies on [4] , in particular for SSB in classical theories, for the exclusion of SSB in finite-dimensional quantum systems by Stone-von Neumann theorem, for the role of the infinite extension for SSB in spin systems. The content of footnote 5 is somewhat misleading, since both in Statistical Mechanics (SM) as well as in Quantum field theory in order to witness SSB one must consider pure phases, i.e. ground state representations which satisfy the cluster property (this may require a decomposition of the representation obtained in terms of the partition function in SM or of the functional integral in QFT). In Section 3, the discussion of the Goldstone theorem and the crucial role of locality, usually overlooked in textbook treatments, relies on [4] , Chapter 15, especially Section 15.2. The general non-perturbative proof that in local gauges the Goldstone bosons cannot be physical was given in [29] , [4] , Theorem 19.1, again not even quoted; the evasion of the Goldstone theorem in the Coulomb gauge due to the lack of locality (rather than the lack covariance) is again clearly discussed in the 2005 edition of [4] . The discussion of Elitzur theorem and its consistency with the occurrence of symmetry breaking in several gauges (like e.g. the Coulomb gauge) was clarified in [12] and discussed at length in [5] , Part C, Chapter II, 2.5, so that the discussion in Section 5 of Smeenk paper does not seem to add anything new.
